# **ANNEX 4**

# THE EWASO BORANA SITUATION REPORT

A working paper seeking to identify critical issues currently affecting the Borana inhabitants of Eastern Isiolo district. Based on observations made during field research May 1992 to March 1993 by Malcolm Hunter - Research Associate with the Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi.

A. SURVIVAL AND SECURITY.

1. The Return of the Rains

The most obvious change in the life of the Ewaso Borana during the period under review is the effect of the abundant rains which fell over the whole of Isiolo district between November '92 and January '93. These resulted in the transformation of the grazing lands from sun baked earth and drifting sand to apparently boundless miles of choice pasture. Grasses of all sorts stand 2 or 3 feet tall and every bush and tree is laden with green leaves and fresh seeds.

A secondary effect of the rains has been the return of the pastoralists to their semi-permanent grass houses which form such a conspicuous feature of Ewaso Borana society - a line of dome-shaped huts and bomas running along the skyline about 2 - 4 kilometers away from the Ewaso Nyiro river. The people have been able to return from the far distant grazing areas and the temporary bomas they had been using last year in what remained of the Lorian Swamp. The abundant grazing and the diminished number of animals allows the cattle to be kept close to the more permanent settlements, barely out of sight of the herd owners so that a few children can watch them. Most of the adults are staying in the settlements. A few of them who planted gardens may go to bring grain from their shambas along the river banks.

2. Recovery of Strength

One obvious reason for this apparently indolent way of life is that both the people and the cattle are still not fully recovered from the stresses of the long dry period just ended. Many of the older men were exhausted by the struggle to keep their animals alive. All of the herd owners interviewed told of losses during 1992 of between a half and two thirds of their animals, most coming in the last few months from the inevitable result of heavy rain falling on desperately weak animals.

With the natural resilience and optimism which is characteristic of pastoralists the Borana seem to have recovered emotionally from the trauma of the losses but are still physically weak as the milk has not yet become plentiful. The primary requirement at present is to rebuild the herds, so all the cows are in calf, meaning that the milk will not come until after another 4 - 6 months. In the meantime the people have to survive on meagre rations and the corn produced in the shambas.

3. The Effect of N.G.O. Feeding Programmes

This has led to another reason why nearly everyone is staying close to the more permanent settlements instead of moving out to the satellite manyattas which they normally use in the main grazing areas. Because of the severe famine conditions which built up to a crisis in 1992 some N.G.O.s have been able to raise the necessary funds to provide food to all the Borana people who would like to receive it. This is not just basic cereal grains but oil, dried milk powder and enriched food for children and babies. These are delivered by truck to the main centres of the community - especially to the settlements which have a chief or assistant chief in residence. The trucks come several times a month but at irregular intervals, so if any Borana wants to receive this food hand-out he has to be there at the distribution point when it arrives. One of the most generous donors in Garba Tula division, to the south of the river, is the Catholic Mission at Garba Tula town with Brother Andre - being the man most often cited as the chief benefactor. The effect of this and other N.G.O.s will be discussed in another working paper as another critical issue inviting further discussion.

2. The Serious Problem of Insecurity

There is one other factor which is causing the people to stay close to their more permanent settlements - recognised by everyone questioned to be far more serious. The first two reasons given earlier are barely acknowledged in comparison with the significance attributed to this third issue, that of insecurity in the area.

If the most experienced herd owners are questioned as to whether it is the normal grazing pattern to keep all the cattle so close to home they will admit that it is not good. They concede that already there is serious overgrazing in the land surrounding the settlements which should be kept for the milk cows later on. They acknowledge that it would be much better to have the non-milking animals out in the wide expanses of prime grazing at present completely untouched except by wild game. They know that they could be making use of the few pans and natural ponds which still contain water at this stage so soon after the rains but they say that it is too much risk. They tell of the raid only last January when 3,500 cattle from Sericho were stolen and several herd boys murdered. They were the non - milking animals which had been sent northwards across to the other side of the river. The army were called to pursue them but non were ever recovered. The herd owners of Sericho understandably speak very strongly of their unwillingness to trust the army to protect their herds if they cannot trace such a number being driven away with all their helicopters and vehicles.

When they are challenged with the success of the army in attacking and killing many shiftas in early February in that same area just across the river, they reply that "It was only luck that the army ran into that raiding party as they are coming back from another patrol and anyway those shiftas were just local Somali from the nearby government controlled town of Modo Gashe. How can the police and army people in a town like that not know when a force of more than 50 Somali men go out to raid the Borana. If they can't control Somalis in their own government town how can they do anything about the real full time bandits and murderers coming from Somalia with their automatic weapons."

4. The History of Borana/Somali relations

If another question is raised about the long standing tradition of raiding between Somali and Borana the elders of the latter all vehemently protest that Ewaso Borana do not raid -they do not need to. They have the best land and the best cattle which is why the Somali keep attacking. In support of their peaceful record they cite the evidence of history and geography. They quote place names throughout Wajir and Mandera districts which are clearly Boran words. They even mention Hargeisa, the capital of northern Somaliland meaning nothing in the Somali language but meaning in Borana an aloe plant. There is no doubt that the Borana have constantly been pushed aside and tricked in alliances with various Somali-related ethnic groups. As recently as 1933 the British Colonial administration allowed them to occupy the Ewaso Nyiro area in compensation for the loss of access to the wells at Wajir. What is most surprising is that the Borana were prepared to enter another alliance with the Somalis in 1963 at the time of Kenya's independence. That was the time of most devastating loss for the Ewaso Borana not only during the enforcement imprisonment in three concentration camps until 1968 but through treachery and exploitation from those who took their animals to Somalia hoping to save them.

There is no denying that there have been centuries of conflict between Borana and Somali related peoples - probably since the Oromo first came down from Ethiopia in the 16th century. For many generations the Borana dominated the smaller groups which accounts for the fact that several like the Ajuran and the Garre now speak Boran. The Degodia were at first the clients of the Ajuran who were in turn the clients of the Boran. They watered their stock at first only by night at the Boran wells to avoid friction. As their numbers increased they finally drove out both the Ajuran and the Boran who had to wait for admission to their own wells.

In 1934 the British Colonial administration tried to resolve the conflict by establishing "tribal grazing grounds", with clear boundaries along what was known as the "Galla - Somali line". They officially declared the Ajuran as Somali which has been a point of contention ever since, as it fails to acknowledge that such a group can have double affiliation. There were many Ajuran wandering all over Isiolo district during 1992 grazing their camels. It was only at the end of the year when some of the Ajuran were accused of being involved in the big raids on Boran villages that they disappeared.

5. Current Changes in Boran/Somali Relations

The main difference from the traditional rivalry reported over and over again by Boran elders in all parts of Isiolo district is that now the Somali are coming not just to take cattle but to take lives. Many of the worst killers moved out of Somali when the United Nations forces and the U.S. army moved in. They brought their sophisticated weapons with them and used them to make a living as they had in their own country. They stopped vehicles, took what they wanted and shot anyone who resisted, even some who did not. Any trader who came to buy animals or sell Miraa was an obvious target as he would have lots of money in his vehicle. This was the pattern through most of 1991 and '92. towards the end of that period a new type of raiding began. Gangs of several hundred heavily armed Somali, including Ajuran, began to attack Boran communities who had nothing else to protect them but a few administrative policemen with ancient single shot rifles. The attacks were not just random or isolated but coordinated on several towns or settlements to give the maximum effect of intimidation. In one particularly bold raid at Kinna about 350 Somali speaking shiftas rampaged through the small township in the early morning, driving out all the animals from the Bomas and killing the chief and 5 policemen who tried to stop them. On this occasion an army truck was able to get to Kinna and 6 soldiers are alleged to have killed between 26 and 67 shiftas,- the number depends on whom you talk to. In spite of that more than 300 animals were never retrieved.

At Malka Daka in November there was an even more brutal raid by several hundred Somali when 17 women and children were killed, many of them by being thrown alive onto their burning houses as they tried to escape. One of the eye witnesses who survived by hiding under the bed in his home told us that he heard the shiftas speaking first in Somali and them in Boran. They were Ajuran he said - not men from Somali.

6. The Battle for Land

Whenever this subject came up in the interviews, the most frequently mentioned reason for the new type of large scale attacks was that "the Somali are not just after our cattle they want to take our land as it is much better than theirs." "Those big attacks with heavy automatic weapons were intended to make us run away and abandon our place in Eastern Isiolo." There were even some in Kinna who told of direct taunting from Somalis that it would only be a matter of time before the Borana were driven out and the Somalis took over all of Ewaso Nyiro area.

"They want to drive us back to Ethiopia so that all of northern Kenya will be their land". That is why the Kinna respondents told us they took up stones in the market and killed 15 Somalis who were suspected of killing a home guard. The fact that the home guard later turned up unhurt and his unfortunate alleged attackers were probably all Ajuran does not reduce the resentment of the Boran towards any whom they regard as Somali. The Boran elders declare their intention not to be intimidated this time,- "We are ready to fight to defend our land." When it is pointed out that they have already surrendered a considerable portion of Isiolo district - that some of the former major towns like Garba Tula and Eldera are virtually dead, they have no ready answer. Some settlements close to the Garissa border such as Skot or even Rapsu, less than 10 kilometers from Kinna have been abandoned. Other major population and communication centres like Modo Gashe and Habus Wein which were formerly considered to be Boran settlements are now totally dominated by Somalis. It is admitted that there are almost as many Boran living in and around Isiolo town as there are remaining in the traditional grazing lands of eastern Isiolo district. Still the elders insist that they will not run away; they will do whatever is necessary to keep their land in Garba Tula and Merti division where the best grazing is found in the Ewaso Nyiro area.

7 Who Has the Guns?

At the height of the big raids at the end of 1992 it was admitted that the Boran had brought down some of their ex-Ethiopian army Boran with their weapons. It was significant that the armies of both neighbouring countries had been disbanded that year with no other form of compensation than the clothes and weapons they were carrying as political upheaval over threw their ruling military regions. This would account for a sudden increase in the availability of modern weapons on the open market even without the inter tribal clashes going on right across northern Kenya. The fighting may possibly have been allowed to continue unchecked if there had not been an international outcry that United Nations forces should be sent to Northern Kenya to control the movements of Somali bandits, especially in attacks on the refugee camps and the food convoys trying to supply them.

In the words of numerous Boran men, "What else can you expect when the Chief of Staff of the Kenyan Army is a Somali." "Of course he is not going to prevent the Somali raiders attacking the Boran." Some enlightened leaders added that the Kenyan Minister of the Interior was also a Somali close relative of General Mohammed so what hope did they have for justice. Any Somali who wanted Kenyan identification papers could get them immediately even if they spoke no Swahili or English or Borana. They pointed to the recent appointments of Somali officials to top positions in Kenya as P.C.'s and D.C.'s as evidence of the pro-Somali trends in this country.

In mid 1992 one senior police official in eastern Isiolo told us that they had all the resources necessary to control and drive out the shifta from that area. The only hindrance was that every time they planned a major preemptive operation against the raiding bands moving around, the order came back from Nairobi that no action should be taken. "We even know where the camps are where those Somali are living but we are not allowed to touch them", he reported. This is obviously a delicate political subject which was not even recorded in last year's reconnaissance report.

The army was mobilized in January 1993 establishing mobile units in Merti, Modo Gashe and Garba Tula. With the aerial support of two military helicopters they were quickly able to drive all the shifta bands out of eastern Isiolo. In Kinna where an army truck arrived in time to inflict considerable damage on the shifta and rescue most of the cattle being stolen, the attitude towards the army is markedly better than in most other areas. The general opinion amongst Borana is that the shifta will return as quickly as they left, as soon as the army withdraws. Some even said that it would be the sort of clever thing that the Somali would do to stay out of Isiolo completely so that the army would soon declare that they were not needed and make an early withdrawal. "If the shifta made any raids then the army would not leave so quickly so we do not expect to see any Somalis for a while."

Who owns the guns has become a very sensitive point in recent weeks as the Kenyan administrative officers working through the appointed chiefs are demanding that all the Boran must hand in their weapons. Whether or not this unilateral disarmament will be total is not clear at this point. We witnessed for ourselves that some guns are being handed in - not without a few defiant final shots being fired, ostensibly to show that the guns are operational. It is not hard to imagine the mutterings going on beneath the surface as the few weapons they have are taken away when the Borana believe that the Somalis back in Wajir and Garissa have hidden their much more modern weapons in the bush until the time is ripe to bring them back into action. Whether or not this is true is debatable but some of the Boran elders say "This is the last time we will trust the army to protect us. If they do not stay and keep the Somali under control then we will never hand in any guns again."

8. The Role of the Homeguards

Apart from the small detachments of 5 to 8 administrative policemen assigned to the various chief's locations, the only other guns permitted by the government are those belonging to the homeguards. These are mostly old 303 rifles of 2nd world war vintage. The men who are given the title of homeguard and allowed to carry the guns are usually Boran pastoralists with little or no training unless they served in the army at one time. They are meant to go out with the herds to protect them in the bush or especially when moving long distances to market. Whatever they may lack in training they make up for in motivation as usually their animals will be part of the herd they are guarding.

Until recent years their guns were reasonably effective and they had a relatively proud record of protecting the herds. In the last 2 years, since the collapse of the Somali government and the consequent proliferation of the latest automatic weapons the homeguards and their weapons have been seen as increasingly inadequate. The confrontation between several hundred Somalis armed with AK47's and half a dozen Borana homeguards with 50 years old rifles have been pathetically unfair and usually fatal.

One of the questions included in the questionnaire used in the field research amongst the Ewaso Borana was, "Who do you think can best protect the Borana herds?" The answer came back quite consistently. "We can if the homeguards are given better weapons." Occasionally someone may have replied, "The army can." but then added, "Who knows how long they are going to stay ...Once they go we will be worse off than before as they have taken away so many of our guns."

9. Security Options

This subject is really beyond the scope of the usual development researcher but in the case of the Borana and in their own estimation security has such a high priority that it would be pointless to discuss any other development proposals without addressing this issue.

a. Keep the army permanently on patrol along the "Galla-Somali line", currently on the boundary between Eastern and North Eastern provinces. This was repeatedly suggested by the older men who remember the British administration when any Somali who crossed over the line was imprisoned. If he brought any animals he was made to forfeit one out of every 10 as a fine. This option is unlikely to be sustainable for any length of time as the Somali continue to proliferate and their grazing deteriorates in Wajir District. They may respect the line when the rains are good in Wajir but when the drought come the pressure to find alternative grazing will be irrepressible.

b. Assign sufficient army personnel to the main population centres who will be required to go out on patrol into the main grazing areas wherever the herds are taken. Possibly one truck with a few well armed soldiers, preferably from pastoralist backgrounds would be sufficient. This would probably mean that they would need to be prepared to visit regularly if not stay in the satellite manyattas where the most vulnerable herds are kept.

c. Recruit and adequately train more Borana homeguards and give them better weapons, more equal to those of their attackers. This option would certainly be the least expensive and the most effective in the long term. It will be most likely to meet with objections from government officials who would suspect that the homeguards or their guns would be used in raiding parties on other ethnic groups - even on government administrators themselves. The only and obvious answer to this suspicion is to ask how often has each pastoral group under consideration been involved in inter- tribal raids or attacks on government officers. There would be several groups in Kenya who would clearly be disqualified under that scrutiny but it would seem that the Ewaso Nyiro Borana have earned that level of trust over the last 30 years. Maybe their last fateful attempt to form an alliance with the Somalis taught them a very hard lesson about who they should cooperate with.

d. The other political action that could be attempted would be for the Kenyan government to call all the chiefs of Borana and Somali together and agree that any man from either side who took part in a raid would be turned in for severe punishment by his own people. Any stolen animal which came into their district must be seized and handed back to its rightful owner with the thief handed in for trial and heavy penalty. This would be least likely to be acceptable to the Borana who say this has been tried many times before, even last year as the raids were building up. They say that whether or not a Somali comes originally from Wajir or Garissa it is always claimed if he is caught that he comes from over the border in Somalia, and therefore the Somalis of Kenya cannot be held responsible for him.

B. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF CULTIVATION

The presence of the seasonal Ewaso river running from West to East right through the heart of Isiolo district is one reason why this area was chosen as a suitable location for this case study. The river which usually flows for about 8 -10 months of the year gives the people the possibility of having an alternative or supplementary means of acquiring food. At the eastern side of the district the river forms a flood plain called the Lorian Swamp. This is prime grazing land during the dry season but before the river enters the main swamp area there are several areas on both sides of the river bed which are suitable for cultivation. The information gathered during the field research indicates that this radical change of life style and economy began mostly between the years 1968 -74. This means that the change was no doubt one drastic result of the aftermath of the shifta wars, 1964 -68, when all the Borana in Isiolo district were forced into 3 concentration camps and at least 90% of their cattle killed or taken away by the Kenya army. Most of what remained were lost by starvation through lack of grazing as none of the herds were allowed to move more than 3 kms away from the camps. The herd losses at that time were undoubtedly the most devastating experience for the Ewaso Borana, from which many of them have never recovered.

There were a few respondents to the questionnaire who related that their fathers and grandfathers had attempted cultivation in Ethiopia before they came to Isiolo. They were the ones who began the attempts at riverine cultivation first. Their efforts usually consist of a hand dug irrigation channel taking water from a suitable point of the river to the communal gardens which were typically cleared out of thick bush with the thorn scrub used to form a fence to keep the animals out. Usually some larger trees and branches are placed in the river bed to get the receding water to enter the irrigation canal for as long as possible.

The major problem with this crude form of irrigation system is that when a full flood of water comes down the river, which can occur several times a year, the water can quickly turn the irrigation canal into the main river course. This means not only that the shambas (gardens) can be swept away by flooding or rapid erosion but the whole course of the river can shift several kilometres in a very short time. The riverine plain consists mostly of sand with small areas of alluvial soil which has been deposited by previous floods. As the cultivators naturally like to choose the patches of relatively fertile soil as close to their settlements as possible these shifts in the river course have led to some of the settlements having to be moved several times in the past 10 years. This was a minor inconvenience as long as the Borana only used their traditional type of portable houses constructed of laminated stick beams and grass mats. The major upheaval and losses have come as the government and N.G.O.s have been trying to encourage the people to build permanent townships with tin roofs and mud walls. Schools and clinics have been built of cement block or prefabricated wooden walls or concrete foundations. There have obviously been some poorly sited projects but it is chiefly the shambas and the irrigation canals which have been the direct cause of their down fall.

Further details of the official irrigation projects attempted along the Ewaso river were given in the reconnaissance report of 1992. The experience gained from these can be most instructive. The people themselves have seen the relative value of different types of projects, and clearly favour the Gafarsa model.

Besides these official and unofficial irrigation schemes along the Ewaso Nyiro river the Borana have moved even more extensively into cultivation in the extreme south of their territory at Kinna. There is a permanent spring just outside the boundary of Meru National Park which has been properly controlled by a dam for piped water as well as using the excess run off for irrigation. Besides these are several small rivers which have their source in the National Park but run outside into the most fertile areas suitable for cultivation - including a considerable amount of black cotton soil around Kinna. This area is not considered good for grazing due to the diseases coming from the ticks which are prevalent in the more verdant vegetation. This has meant that many Borana who lost all their animals or who did not have enough for survival would move to Kinna to try their hand at cultivation.

About 13 years ago the N.C.C.K began a new venture at a very suitable place called Rapsu about 10 kms away from Kinna. This was a proper resettlement scheme for destitute Borana families who were given about 1 acre of good land and the essential assistance to get started. As Rapsu was so close to the Game Park considerable investment was needed to try to construct an elephant proof fence around the well watered scheme. Two hundred families were doing well making enough money to build their own tin roofed houses when a serious shifta attack came in 1988 taking 10 lives. This caused all the people to flee, abandoning their homes and gardens with nobody willing to go back even to this day. This has meant not only 200 families again rendered destitute but also a serious loss of food to be sold in the Kinna market.

The buildings on the Rapsu scheme, schools, stores and offices are now being destroyed by white ants and thieves taking the roof sheeting, doors and windows. It would be a tragic loss if this scheme is allowed to be totally lost because of a lack of adequate security. It is sadly indicative of the value placed upon security in Eastern Isiolo that this successful scheme has been allowed to remain abandoned for the last 5 years.

One of the immediate results of a serious commitment to an adequate level of security would be government action to do whatever is necessary to establish full control over the whole area along the border with Garissa district where the vast majority of the attacks on Garba Tula town and district are coming from. One of the most well known sources of Somali attacks is the Somali township of Benale (sometimes pronounced Benane). This is only about 12 kms away from Garba Tula and was at one time a Boran settlement. They claim that the boundary was moved to give the Somali the important watering place there on the river.

The Benale people frequently come to Garba Tula to the market so they are easily recognised when they come back with a shifta raiding party. There have been several large scale attacks on Garba Tula during the last 2 years which have involved 50 to 100 mean shooting for several hours. The fact that so few physical and material losses were actually sustained probably indicates that the main purpose of the attack was intimidatory, not for plunder. In this the raiders have been successful as the population of Garba Tula is probably less than half of what it was 3 years ago. Here is a clear opportunity for the government to demonstrate its serious commitment to restoring and maintaining security. If the Somali of Benale are involved in any further raids then the whole population could be cleared out for a punitive period.

C. SECONDARY ISSUES

Apart from the direct effects of insecurity on the Ewaso Borana there are indirect effects which are a major impediment on development and even the maintenance of a healthy society.

The most obvious is the reluctance of government employed and appointed personnel to work in the rural areas where insecurity is a problem. This is particularly serious in Isiolo district where the district headquarters is at the extreme southwestern corner, on a little southern bulge of a what looks like a pan handle attached to the main body of the district consisting of Merti and Garba Tula divisions. These two divisions cover more than 80% of the total land area of the district which is listed at 25,605 sq.km. The total population of the district was estimated in 1988 to be about 65,000 with approximately half of those being Borana.

The remote location of the district capital from the geographical epicentre of the district means that the majority of government personnel get as far as Isiolo town where the tarmac ends and rarely if ever get out to their appointed locations. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of those assigned to serve the pastoralists in the main grazing areas in eastern Isiolo, such as those working in veterinary, livestock and range management, public health clinics and dispensaries, and the water departments. An example of this break down of services is shown by a visit that was made in March 1993 to the District Veterinary office in Isiolo district head quarters. A chart was found on the wall which showed more than 20 people assigned to Merti and Garba Tula division. During our travels in this areas over the previous weeks we had constantly heard the complaint that there were no veterinary workers in their posts and none had been seen for about a year. When the senior veterinary officer was questioned as to the truth of this allegation he admitted that because of the security problems in the area all his people were staying in Isiolo town. It was somewhat embarrassing to press for more information as to when any veterinary officer had last stayed in his assigned position in Merti or Garba Tula but it was acknowledged that it could possibly be for a year or more. I raised the point that other government workers such as the D.O.'s were out on the job. He replied that it was all right for them as they had police and army to protect them.

The same story had arisen in July last year when I visited the District Water Development offices in Isiolo. I was inquiring in particular as to the reason why the new workshop built and fully equipped in Merti with foreign aid was not being used. I had heard that the British High Commissioner flew into Merti to open the workshop and the next day all the tools and equipment were loaded onto Water Development trucks and taken back to Isiolo head quarters. The deputy district water engineer who was the highest official in the office that day confirmed that this was done because of lack of security and adequate staff housing in Merti. He acknowledged that this meant that the nearest water engineer was now about 200 kilmeters away from the bore hole pumps where there services would be most needed but suggested that the people in Isiolo town also needed these services. There appeared to be a staff of about 50 in the water development offices in Isiolo with at least 6 vehicles in the garage.

It would be an interesting but sensitive area of research to find out more precise details as to the deployment of all the government personnel assigned to work in eastern Isiolo. There appeared to be a few down country people working in the clinics and dispensaries but the only others in the field were Borana school teachers and bore hole pump operators.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION

Guarantees of security are clearly essential if non-Borana staff are to be willing to move out of Isiolo town. If these are not present this deficiency will be given as the reason for not proceeding to the distant posting. The more likely causes of reluctance to move are the difficulties of transport and communications, lack of electricity, social life and beer! It is indeed hard for a veterinary office trained in the suburbs of Nairobi to accept a posting anywhere north or east of Isiolo. The paucity of social amenities would be more than enough to discourage his going, even without the real or imagined problem of insecurity.

The second approach to this problem is more long term but could ultimately be far more likely to succeed. This would be to deliberately choose young men and women from Ewaso Borana communities or at least from secondary schools in Garba Tula and Merti who could be trained to meet the needs of the pastoral communities.

A few years ago the number of Boran young people with sufficient education to enter government service was very small. Nowadays thanks largely to the efforts of the Catholic missionaries in Isiolo and Merti in offering financial assistance for secondary and higher education there are a growing number of suitably qualified young men and women. Those who have taken their secondary education in Garba Tula and Merti are probably the most likely candidates who would be willing to come back for service in their home country. There are Borana students in other secondary schools in Kenya who may be interested in returning to northern Kenya to serve their own people in all the traditional Boran districts, Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale.

SUMMARY OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY

It has often been said that whatever other factors may be considered important for successful development activity an adequate level of security and political stability are essential. It would appear that this is applicable to the Ewaso Boran not just for any proposed development intervention but also for the maintenance of their normal way of life and survival.

It is one of the sad realities of pastoral life where different ethnic groups are in competition for water and grazing that very often the conflict results in nobody being able to use the best grazing under dispute. The Ewaso Boran are a living demonstration of this unfortunate state of affairs.

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